COMMENT
INFORMING THE JURY OF THE LEGAL
EFFECT OF SPECIAL VERDICT
ANSWERS IN COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
During the past decade numerous states with comparative negligence systems have permitted judges to inform juries of the legal effect
of special verdict answers in negligence actions.' These states have reversed the trend of judicial decisions that commenced before the turn
of the century in Wisconsin. The Wisconsin decisions held that it is
reversible error to inform the jury in any civil case of the legal effect of
special verdict answers. 2 The "Wisconsin rule" was predicated on the
objective of special verdicts-to attain findings of fact untainted by
prejudice or sympathy for or against one of the parties.3 If juries are
told about the effect their determinations will have on the outcome of
the case, then they may adjust the special verdict answers to comport
with a predetermined outcome.4 Although the rule against informing
protects against this possible jury bias, nearly a dozen states have recently perceived the need to abrogate this rule in comparative negligence cases.
This comment discusses the development and application of the
Wisconsin rule. The comment then describes the recent movement toward rejection of the rule and analyzes the arguments both for and
against its application. After emphasizing the compatibility of the Wisconsin rule with the equitable goals of the comparative negligence principle, the comment concludes by endorsing the rule and recommending
procedural changes that will assist the courts in fulfilling the purposes
of the special verdict scheme.
1. See text accompanying notes 63-81 infra.
2. See text accompanying notes 26-46 infra.
3. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 141-42 (1949).
4. See generally Note, Informingthe Jury of the LegalEffect of its 4nswersto Special Verdict
Questions Under Kansas Comparative Negigence Law-A Reply to the Masses: A Casefor the
Minority View, 16 WASHBURN LJ. 114 (1976).
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I.

INFORM2ING THE JURY
THE EMERGENCE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

The doctrine of comparative negligence has gained increasing
popularity among legal commentators, state courts, and legislatures as
a means of mitigating the harshness of the common law contributory
negligence defense. A system of contributory negligence completely
bars a plaintiff from recovery against a negligent defendant if the plain-

tiffs negligence is a proximate cause of his damages. 5 A system of

comparative negligence apportions the relative negligence of the parties
6
and reduces the plaintiffs recovery according to his degree of fault.
Although the defense of contributory negligence remains under the
comparative negligence system, the plaintiff's negligence reduces,
rather than bars, his award of damages.7 The comparative negligence
system is fairer than the system based on the all-or-nothing contributory negligence defense because under the former a negligent plaintiff
may recover for damages proximately caused by the defendant's

negligence.
Jurisdictions have adopted the principle of comparative negligence
by statutory enactments and judicial decision. 9 In addition, a number
5. Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). To ameliorate the unfairness of
the all-or-nothing defense, numerous exceptions have been carved out of the contributory negligence doctrine. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.2, at 5-9 (1974); Prosser,
ComparativeNegligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465, 470-75 (1953).
6. Throughout this comment, the terms "negligence" and "fault" are used interchangeably.
A fine distinction exists, however, between the terms as used by the state courts. A comparative
fault system demands the quantification of all nonintentional tortious conduct. See, e.g., ARKSTAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979). A comparative negligence system mandates an apportionment of damages only when ordinary negligence has been committed. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 5.3, at 105 (1974); see, eg., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973 & Supp.

1980).
7. But see text accompanying notes 13-14 infra. In cases that implicate the conduct of both
parties, the trier of fact determines the relative responsibility of the parties in causing the harm.
This determination typically involves allocating specific percentages of negligence among the parties, with the sum necessarily equaling 100%. These figures are then used to remit the plaintiffs
total damages to arrive at the amount of his recovery. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 3.2 (1974).
8. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1976); Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1976); Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1765 (1979);
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973 & Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h (1981); HAWAII
REv. STAT. § 663-31 (1976); IDAHo CODE § 6-801 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1976); LA.
ClV. CODE ANNmi.
art. 2323 (West Supp. 1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980); MAss.
ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1978); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 58-607.1 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-1151 (1979); NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.141 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1979);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page Supp. 1980); OKrLA.
STAT. tit. 23, § 13 (1980); OR. REv. STAT. § 18.470 (1979); 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 7102 (1978); R.L
GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1980); S.D. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979); TaX. REv. CIw. STAT.
ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
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of state courts have recognized their inherent power to modify the contributory negligence defense by adopting a comparative fault system,
but have chosen to defer to the legislature.10
Comparative negligence systems take two basic forms: pure and
modified.' The forms differ regarding whether the plaintiffs percentage of the total fault will bar him from recovery. A pure comparative
negligence system guarantees that a negligent plaintiff will recover
damages from a negligent defendant regardless of the plaintiffs degree
of causal responsibility for the accident. Under the pure form the
plaintiff's total damages are reduced in proportion to the percentage of
his negligence. This method of calculating damages is the fairer of the
two because the amount of recovery is derived directly from the de2
fendant's relative fault.'
Modified comparative negligence incorporates the principle that a
party who is more at fault should not be allowed to recover from one
less at fault.' 3 Consequently, a barrier is imposed at either the 50% or
the 51% negligence level which prevents the recovery of any damages.
There are two types of modified comparative negligence systems.
Under the "49%" type the plaintiff cannot recover damages if his negligence is as great as or greater than that of the defendant; under the
12, § 1036 (Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010 (1979); Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1977); Wyo.
STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977).
9. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975) (admiralty); Kaatz v. State,
540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d
886 (1981); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); Scott v.
Rizzo, No. 13,235 (N.M. Feb. 12, 1981), qfl'g Claymore v. City of Albuquerque, No. 4804 (N.M.
Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1980); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
Georgia has the oldest judicially-adopted comparative negligence system presently in existence. See Flanders v. Meath, 27 Ga. 358 (1858). The Georgia scheme actually is based on a
strained construction of a comparative fault statute expressly applicable only in railroad accident
cases. See Smith v. American Oil Co., 77 Ga. App. 463, 49 S.E.2d 90 (1948).
10. See, ag., Golden v. McCurry, 392 So. 2d 815, 817 (Ala. 1980); Fuller v. Buhrow, 292
N.W.2d 672, 674 (Iowa 1980); Epple v. Western Auto Supply Co., 557 S.W.2d 253, 254 (Mo.
1977). See generally Fleming, The Supreme Court of California1974-1975-Forewor" Compara.
tive
Negligence At Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV.239 (1976); James, Kalven, Keeton, Le Flar, Malone, & Wade, Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory
Negligencc" Should the Court or LegislatureDecide?, 21 VAND. L. REv. 889 (1968); Schwartz,
Comment .udicialAdoptfion of ComparativeNegh'gence--The Supreme Court of Calpfornia Takes a
Historic Stand, 51 IND. LJ.281 (1976).
11. A third variation of comparative negligence is the slight/gross form, in which a negligent
plaintiff recovers only when his negligence is slight in comparison with that of the defendant. This
form is used in only two states, see Na. REV.STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 20-9-2 (1979), and has been criticized by legal commentators. See Prosser, supra note 5,at 48689.
12. See Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 642-44, 256 N.W.2d 400, 428-29 (1977).
13. V. ScHwARTz, CoMPARArivE NEGLIGENCE § 3.5(B), at 78 (1974).
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"50%" type the plaintiff cannot recover if his negligence is greater than

the defendant's, but can recover if his negligence is as great as the
4
defendant's.'
Legal commentators have debated the advantages and disadvantages of the pure and the modified forms of comparative negligence.
Proponents of the modified form contend that a plaintiff should not be
able to profit from his own wrong. 15 Proponents of the pure form point
out that the 50% or 51% cut-off of modified comparative negligence
imposes an arbitrary barrier affecting the determination of liability.
They argue that the modified form does not eliminate the contributory
negligence defense, but merely shifts the complete bar to recovery to a
different level. 16 Because of the relative merits of each system, how-

ever, both forms must be considered in an analysis of comparative negligence trial procedure.
II. THE USE OF SPECIAL VERDICTS IN COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS

In most comparative negligence cases a jury determines the relative percentages of negligence of the parties and the total amount of the
14. The two variations of modified comparative negligence reach different results only in
cases that assess the plaintiff's negligence at exactly 50%. This difference is more significant than
one might expect, given the high frequency of 50-50 apportionments. See note 34 infra.
15. Ghiardi, ComparativeNegligence-The Case Against a Missssopi 2)pe Statute, 10 Fop
Ta DEF. 61, 64 (1969). Critics of pure comparative negligence also assert that the result under
that form of negligence too often depends not on the relative fault of the parties, but on the
amount of damages suffered. See Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 883 (W. Va.
1979). For example, ifthe negligence is apportioned at 80% and 20% and the damages at $100,000
and $ 10,000 to the plaintiff and the defendant respectively, the result will be a net recovery by the
plaintiff of $12,000. Although the amount recovered by the plaintiff is a small portion of his
damages, the defendant, whose conduct is much less objectionable, is completely unreimbursed.
16. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 827, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 874
(1975). It is difficult to justify the vastly different treatment in a modified system between cases in
which the plaintiff is slightly more negligent than the defendant and those in which the plaintiff is
slightly less negligent than the defendant. Keeton, Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative .
Contributory Negligence Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 906, 911
(1968).
Pure comparative negligence is consistent with the spirit of comparative negligence because it
permits the "more wrong" plaintiff to recover from the "less wrong" defendant and sets the recovery at an amount directly proportionate to the defendant's fault. Although the plaintiff wins a
judgment, the amount of damages recoverable is sharply diminished. See Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 126, 177 N.W.2d 513, 515 (1970) (quoting Campbell, Wisconsin Law
Governing 4utomobile 4ccidents-PartI, 1962 Wis. L. Rnv. 557, 569).
The pure versus modified comparative negligence debate has also focused on the effects the
two forms of negligence have on judicial administration. Administrative concerns, however,
should not outweigh the substantive policy considerations that underlie the form of comparative
negligence to be adopted.
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plaintiff's damages.' 7 The court then performs a mathematical computation to reduce the damages in proportion to the plaintiff's degree of
negligence in order to arrive at the judgment amount.' 8 Because of the
numerical specificity of the jury's findings of fact, special verdict questions or special interrogatories are helpful to the performance of the
jury's task and the interpretation of the findings by the court.' 9
The jury's use of special findings in a comparative negligence action facilitates a logical consideration of the fdctual issues in a case 20
21
and independent inquiries into the issues of negligence and damages.
Moreover, by removing the results of the jury's deliberations from the
"cloak of secrecy" of the general verdict, 22 the use of special verdicts
enables both trial and appellate courts to monitor closely the jury's performance of its designated task. By permitting full disclosure of the
findings of fact, special verdict submission fits neatly into the compara17. These numerical findings are often referred to as the ultimate findings of fact. They
represent a quantification of the jury's determinations of culpability and causality of the conduct
of the plaintiff and the defendant.
18. In states that require the jury to return only a general verdict, see note 23 infra, the jury
performs the mathematical reduction to ascertain the judgment amount.
19. See Brown, FederalSpecial Verdict: The Doubt Eliminator, 44 F.R.D. 338, 346 (1967).
Special verdicts involve the submission to the jury of specific questions which require written
answers that constitute the findings of fact in a civil case without a rendering by the jury of a
general verdict in favor of a party. This procedure differs from the submission of general verdicts
accompanied by special interrogatories, whereby the jury answers specific questions and also renders a verdict for or against each party. See generally Morgan, A BrieHistory of Special Verdicts
and SpecialInterrogatories,32 YAL E L. 575 (1923); Sunderland, Verdicts, Generaland Special,
29 YALE L. 253 (1920). For a thorough discussion of the advantages of special verdict submission, see Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,335 U.S. 816 (1948).
20. Florida East Coast Ry. v. Lawrence, 328 So. 2d 249, 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (quoting Timmons & Silvis, Pure ComparativeNegligence in .orida" A NewAdventure in the Common
Law, 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 737, 802 (1974)), rev'don otherground&, 346 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1977).
21. V. SCHWARTZ, Cow ARATivE NEGLIGENCE § 17.4, at 289 (1974). Theoretically, once the
relative responsibility of the parties has been quantified, the elements involved in that computation should not affect the determination of damages.
One article describes the "double deduction," an undesirable phenomenon that may occur

when the negligence and damages issues are not considered separately. The author observes a
tendency for the jury, either consciously or unconsciously, to reduce the gross damages figure to
represent something less than the fotal damages suffered by the plaintiff. The judge, upon receiving the special verdict answers, then reduces the damages a second time, resulting in a deflated
recovery. Nixon, he Actual 'egislative Intent"RehindNew Hampshire':ComparativeNegligence
Statute, 12 N.H.BJ. 17,27-28 (1969); see, ag., Schlein v. Florida East Coast Ry., 339 So. 2d 1142
(Fla. Dist. CL App. 1976).
22. Prosser, supra note 5, at 502. To illustrate this point in the context of a pure comparative
negligence system, assume that the jury returns only a general verdict for the plaintiff in the
amount of $20,000. In such a case, neither the court nor the parties would be able to determine

whether the jury found the plaintiff20% negligent and damaged in the amount of $25,000, or 60%
negligent and damaged in the amount of $50,000, or some other combination. This uncertainty is
also present when general verdicts are used under modified comparative negligence systems, although the range of possible numerical findings is somewhat narrower.
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tive negligence scheme. For these reasons, the special verdict has been
designated "the very cornerstone of the comparative negligence
concept."23
When a general verdict form with special interrogatories is submitted to the jury, the court must fully inform the jury of the applicable
comparative negligence law so that the jurors may conform the general
verdict to the applicable law. When special verdicts alone are submitted, however, the jury's task is simply to return the fault and damages
findings; the court performs the subsequent computations and enters a
judgment in accordance with the comparative negligence law. Because
the jury does not return a general verdict, it is not essential that the
jurors be aware of the applicable law.
The special verdict findings of fact must be objective, shielded
from the influence of juror bias and sympathy. Informing the jury of
the legal effect of the special verdict answers may affect the objectivity
of the jury in two important respects. First, in a modified comparative
negligence system, if the jury is apprised of the effect of its percentage
determinations on the outcome of the case, it becomes aware of the bar
to the plaintiffs recovery at the 50% or 51% contributory negligence
level. With this knowledge, the jury, rather than objectively allocating
the fault, may adjust the percentage findings solely to enable or prevint
a recovery. 24 Second, under either form of comparative negligence, if
the jury is informed that the court will reduce the total damages in
proportion to the plaintiffs negligence to determine the amount of recovery, the jury's formulation of the negligence or the damages findings
may be influenced.' 5
23. C. HEFT & C. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 8.10 (1978). Special verdicts are utilized in comparative negligence cases in the federal courts, see FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a),

and in a majority of comparative negligence states. The rules governing the submission of special
verdicts in such cases are of three basic types: (I) special verdicts are mandatory, see, e.g., Law-

rence v. Florida East Coast Ry., 346 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(b)
(1976); (2) special verdicts are mandatory upon the request of one or both parties, see, e.g., MIN.
STAT. § 604.01(1) (1978); and (3) special verdict submission is a matter of trial court discretion, see,
e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 824 n.18, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240 n.18, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858,
872 n.18 (1975); FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
A minority of comparative negligence states prohibits the submission of special verdicts in
comparative negligence cases. See, eg., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1979). Several of
those states, however, specifically require the use of special interrogatories with general verdicts.
See, eg., Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 885-86 (W. Va. 1979); OHIo REv..
CODE ANN. § 2315.19(B) (Page 1981).
24. See note 93 infra.
25. See, ag., Thomas v. Board of Township Trustees, 224 Kan. 539, 582 P.2d 271 (1978);
Rosenthal v. Kolars, 304 Minn. 378, 231 N.W.2d 285 (1975). In Thomas the trial court had instructed the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover if his fault was less than 50%, but not if
his fault was 50% or more. The jury, with this knowledge, returned a special verdict allocating
49% of the fault to the plaintiff and 51%to the defendant township, resulting in a judgment for the
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THE RULE AGAINST INFORMING

A. Adoption of the Rule Against Informing.
Wisconsin was the first state to recognize the problems of inform-

ing the jury of the legal effects of special verdict answers in a comparative negligence action. This early recognition reflects the state's
reputation as a pioneer in the areas of comparative negligence and special verdict submission. In 1890, long before Wisconsin abandoned
contributory negligence as a complete defense to a negligence action,
its supreme court announced a rule against informing applicable to all
civil trials in which special verdicts are submitted. 26 The court noted
that in order to secure special verdict answers free from bias or
prejudice for or against a party, the jury "must not consider the effect
which their answers may have upon. . . the controversy or the parties." 27 In Banderob v. Wisconsin CentralRailway28 the supreme court
laid out a general statement of the rule, holding that it constitutes "reversible error for the trial court by instruction. . . to inform the jury
expressly or by necessary implication of the effect of [a special verdict
answer] upon the ultimate right of either party litigant to recover or
upon the ultimate liability of either party litigant." 29 The rule against
informing was later extended to prevent counsel from arguing the effect
of the answers to the jury.30 Violation of the rule was a frequent object

of judicial review in Wisconsin negligence cases. 31
Informing the jury of the effect of its answers on the outcome of a
negligence case continued to be reversible error 32 after the Wisconsin

plaintiff. In Rosenthal the jury had returned special verdicts setting the negligence of the plaintiff
and the defendant at 35% and 65% respectively and the damages at $75,000. Believing that the
jury intended a recovery of the full $75,000, the trial court reinstructed the jury solely on the effect
of Minnesota's comparative negligence statute on the damages answer. The jury subsequently
returned special verdicts containing the same negligence apportionment, but with damages of
$116,000. These examples illustrate the propensity ofjuries to shape the special verdict answers to
accomplish desired results when they are informed of the legal effects of the findings.
26. Ryan v. Rockford Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 611, 46 N.W. 885 (1890). See generally Annot., 90
A.L.R.2d 1040, 1049-51 (1963).
27. Ryan v. Rockford Ins. Co., 77 Wis. at 616, 46 N.W. at 886.
28. 133 Wis. 249, 113 N.W. 738 (1907).
29. Id at 287, 113 N.W. at 751.
30. See Pecor v. Home Indem. Co., 234 Wis. 407, 291 N.W. 313 (1940).
31. See, ag., Anderson v. Seelow, 224 Wis. 230, 271 N.W. 844 (1937); Van De Bogart v.
Marinette & Menominee Paper Co., 127 Wis. 104, 106 N.W. 805 (1906); Lyon v. City of Grand
Rapids, 121 Wis. 609,99 N.W. 311 (1904); Musbach v. Wisconsin Chair Co., 108 Wis. 57, 84 N.W.
36 (1900); Ward v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R.R., 102 Wis. 215,78 N.W. 442 (1899); Coats v. Town of
Stanton, 90 Wis. 130, 62 N.W. 619 (1895).
32. See, eg., Blalnik v. Dax, 22 Wis. 2d 67, 125 N.W.2d 364 (1963); Erb v. Mutual Serv. Cas.
Co., 20 Wis. 2d 530, 123 N.W.2d 493 (1963). See also De Groot v. Van Akkeren, 225 Wis, 105,
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legislature adopted a "49%" comparative negligence system in 1931.33
Subsequently, however, the Wisconsin legislature became aware of the

tendency of juries in comparative negligence cases to apportion fault
equally between the plaintiff and the defendant and of the unfairness of

the resulting dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.3 4 One solution to
this problem which the legislature considered was the abrogation of the

rule against informing. 35 If juries were made aware of the effect of a
fifty-fifty apportionment, then the possibility of an unintended dismissal of the plaintiff's claim might be diminished. 36 Another alternative
was to amend the comparative negligence statute by substituting the
"50%" form for the "49%" form. This substantive change would elimi-

nate the unfairness problem by permitting the plaintiff to recover half
his damages in the case of a fifty-fifty finding-a more equitable result
than dismissal-without tainting the entire factfinding process by indirectly 37 informing the jury of the effect of all possible apportionments.

Furthermore, this solution would not disturb the judicially enunciated
rule against informing, nor would it violate one of the purposes of special verdict submission: to prevent the arousal of bias or sympathy in
the minds of the jurors. 38 For these reasons, the Wisconsin legislature
opted for the latter solution and in 1971 enacted a modified "50%"
115, 273 N.W. 725, 730 (1937) (the court did not reach the question of whether such conduct was
reversible error, but warned the trial court not to repeat the practice on retrial).
33. 1931 Wis. Laws ch. 242 (current version at Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1977)).
34. This unfair result, although often unintended by the jury, was compelled by Wisconsin's
modified "49%" form of comparative negligence. The state legislature had made a rational policy
decision that a claimant should not be permitted to recover in a negligence action unless found to
be less at fault than his opponent. The frequency of 50-50 findings caused the unfairness problem,
however. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 3.5(B), at 77-78 (1974).
Reasons for the tendency of juries to apportion equally the negligence of the parties include
(1) polarization of the jury, resulting in a compromise on the issue of negligence, (2) inability of
the jury to draw a finer factual distinction, (3) conflicting evidence that boils down to a credibility
contest between the parties, and (4) the jury's realistic reflection of responsibility. The frequency
of the 50-50 apportionment basically stems from the vagaries of human nature and the desire to
"split the difference." See generally Fleming, supra note 10, at 245; Flynn, ComparativeNegligence: The Debate, 8 TRIAL 49, 50-51 (May-June 1972).
35. The Wisconsin legislature considered, but did not enact, a proposal that would have required the trial judge to give an ultimate-outcome instruction. See Smith, ComparativeNegligence
Problems with the Special Verdict: Informing the Jury of the Legal Effects of Their Answers, 10
LAND & WATER L. REV. 199, 223-24 (1975).
36. A jury that is aware of the legal consequences of the special verdict answers, especially in
a modified comparative negligence jurisdiction, is less likely to apportion hastily the parties' negligence. Cf.Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 193, 579 P.2d 683, 690 (1978) (an informed jury will
closely examine the facts). But see text accompanying note 101 infra.
37. An instruction informing the jury of the result of a 50-50 apportionment indirectly conveys information concerning the consequences of a finding of greater or lesser degrees of
negligence.
38. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
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comparative negligence system. 39 Notwithstanding this change, and
despite persistent criticism,40 Wisconsin still recognizes the rule against
informing.41
The consensus among the states until the 1970s was that the Wisconsin rule was a necessary component of special verdict procedure in
negligence actions. Once the rule against informing became firmly entrenched in the Wisconsin courts at the turn of the century, recognition
by other states soon followed. 42 Informing the jury was held to be reversible error in negligence actions whether the information was conveyed by the court 43 or by counsel. 44 When the states began to adopt
45
comparative negligence systems, the rule against informing remained.
State lawmakers apparently believed that retaining the Wisconsin rule
was consistent with the equitable goals that inspired the adoption of the
comparative negligence principle. Until the 1970s every state legislature and every state court of last resort to consider the rule against informing adopted the Wisconsin approach. The Wisconsin rule was
39. 1971 Wis. Laws ch. 47 (codified at Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1977)).
40. See, ag., Kobelinski v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 504, 526-27,
202 N.W.2d 415,428 (1972) (Hallows, C.J., concurring); Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d

120, 139, 177 N.W.2d 513, 522 (1970) (Hallows, CJ., dissenting); Ryan, Are Instructions Which
Inform the Jury of the Effect of TheirAnswers Inimicalto Justice?, 1940 Wis. L. REv. 400.
41. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin responded to numerous arguments in derogation of the
rule against informing in McGowan v. Story, 70 Wis. 2d 189, 234 N.W.2d 325 (1975). The court,
in upholding the trial judge's refusal to grant requests by both the plaintiff and the jury to give an
ultimate-outcome instruction, summarized the basic principles of the Wisconsin rule:
[A]ny change in the rule [against informing] would be contrary to the established basis
for the use of juries, particularly in negligence cases.
l . . [T e jury is the finder of fact and it has no function in determining how the
law should be applied to the facts found. It is not the function of a jury in a case between
private parties on the determination of comparative negligence to be influenced by sympathy for either party, nor should it attempt to manipulate the apportionment of negligence to achieve a result that may seem socially desirable to a single juror or to a group
ofjurors.
Id at 197-98, 234 N.W.2d at 329. See also Shawver v. Roberts Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 672, 280 N.W.2d
226 (1979).
42. See, ag., Morrison v. Lee, 13 N.D. 591, 102 N.W. 223 (1904); McFaddin v. Hebert, 118
Tex. 314, 15 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved).
43. See, ag., Rohr v. Henderson, 207 Kan. 123, 483 P.2d 1089 (1971); McCourtie v. United
States Steel Corp., 253 Minn. 501, 93 N.W.2d 552 (1958); Smith v. Capital Fin. Co., 169 Ohio St.
11, 157 N.E.2d 315 (1959); Texas & P. Ry. v. Hancock, 59 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
44. See, ag., International Harvester Co. v. Pike, 249 Ark. 1026, 466 S.W.2d 901 (1971);
Ferderer v. Northern Pac. Ry., 77 N.D. 169,42 N.W.2d 216 (1950); Texas & P. Ry. v. Edwards, 36
S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, holding approved).
45. See Argo v. Blackshear, 242 Ark. 817, 416 S.W.2d 314 (1967); Simpson v. Anderson, 186
Colo. 163, 526 P.2d 298 (1974); Avery v. Wadlington, 186 Colo. 158, 526 P.2d 295 (1974); Holland
v. Peterson, 95 Idaho 728, 518 P.2d 1190 (1974); McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 423
(Utah 1974); Woodward v. Haney, 564 P.2d 844 (Wyo. 1977). See also T x.R. Civ. P. 277
(promulgated by the Supreme Court of Texas in 1973).
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entrenched as the clear majority rule.46
B. Application of the Rule Against Informing.

Soon after the Supreme Court of Wisconsin announced the rule
against informing, courts began to carve exceptions out of the rule.
These exceptions obviated the need for reversal in every case in which

the jury was exposed to information concerning the legal effect of its
special verdict answers and paved the way for the current movement

toward abrogation of the rule.
The first modification adopted by the Wisconsin courts was the
common-knowledge exception to the rule against informing. In
Banderob v. Wisconsin Central Railway47 the Supreme Court of Wis-

consin held that reversible error is not committed simply because "an
intelligent juror might... ascertain from the judge's charge by inference the effect upon the case of his [special verdict] answer ...."48
The common-knowledge exception has been applied to information
conveyed by the court 49 or by counsel 50 that is merely cumulative of the

knowledge that an ordinary juror would possess at the conclusion of
the trial. The advent of comparative negligence and its use of complex

numerical findings makes it doubtful, however, that a juror would per46. No clear-cut rule has developed in the federal courts concerning whether the jury should
be informed of the legal effect of special verdict answers. The decision that went the furthest
toward adoption of the rule against informing is Thedorf v. Lipsey, 237 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1956).
In 7hedorf, a comparative negligence action, the court upheld the trial judge's refusal to instruct
the jury on legal principles and stated that knowledge of the effect of special verdict answers is not
within the province of the jury. Id at 193-94. This dicta strongly intimates that it would have
been error to so instruct the jury. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2509, at 511 (1971).
The Wisconsin rule was explicitly rejected in Lowery v. Clouse, 348 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1965),
a negligence action tried under Minnesota law prior to the state's adoption of a comparative fault
system. The court, in an opinion by Chief Judge, now Justice, Blackmun, noted the proscription
of ultimate-outcome instructions in Texas and Wisconsin, but deemed that rule inapplicable in the
federal courts. Lowery distinguished federal special verdict procedure under rule 49, FED. . Civ.
P. 49, which gives the trial judge discretion to choose the form of the submitted verdict, from the
practice of mandatory special verdict submission in those states. A rigid rule against informing
was thought to be contrary to the significant amount of discretion granted to federal judges by the
federal rules. 348 F.2d at 260-61. See also Porche v. Gulf Miss. Marine Corp., 390 F. Supp. 624
(E.D. La. 1975) (Jones Act action).
47. 133 Wis. 249, 113 N.W. 738 (1907).
48. Id at 268-69, 113 N.W. at 744 (interpreting Chopin v. Badger Paper Co., 83 Wis. 192,53
N.W. 452 (1892)). See also Swiergul v. Town of Suamico, 204 Wis. 114, 235 N.W. 548 (1931).
49. See, eg., Wright v. Covey, 233 Ark. 798, 801-02, 349 S.W.2d 344, 347 (1961); Sullivan v.
Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., 55 N.D. 353, 369, 213 N.W. 841, 847 (1927); Finck Cigar Co. v.
Campbell, 134 Tex. 250, 253, 133 S.W.2d 759, 760 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1939, holding approved).
50. See, ag., Reichert v. Northern Pac. Ry., 39 N.D. 114, 147, 167 N.W. 127, 138 (1917);
McFaddin v. Hebert, 118 Tex. 314,323-24, 15 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding
approved).
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ceive the effect of the negligence and damages answers on the outcome
of a case from knowledge gleaned during the trial alone.5 1
A related exception to the rule against informing is the submission
of conditional special verdict questions, which require an answer from
the jury only if specified previous questions have been answered in a
particular way. Although conditional questions indirectly inform the
jury of the legal effect of the previous answer or answers, it is not always reversible error to submit questions conditionally. 52 In Schroeder
v. Rainbold 53 the Commission of Appeals of Texas observed that conditional submission is permissible if the jury is not thereby informed of
the effect of previous answers that determine the case.54 Moreover, reversal because of the rule against informing is unnecessary when the
condition does not convey to the jury information outside the jury's
common knowledge.55 Both the conditional-question exception and
the common-knowledge exception thus restrict the scope of the rule
against informing in situations in which strict application of the rule
does not appreciably aid in the attainment of objective findings of fact.
Some states, although expressly recognizing the Wisconsin rule,
have limited its application to prohibit only blatant violations. These
states have given trial courts the discretion to determine whether to inform the jury in a particular situation. Texas's current application of
the rule against informing illustrates this development. In 1973, the
Texas legislature adopted a modified "50%" comparative negligence
system. 56 The Supreme Court of Texas responded in the same year by
57
amending rule 277 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure:
The court shall not in its charge... advise the jury of the effect
of their answers, but the court's charge shall not be objectionable on
the ground that it incidentally ...advises the jury of the effect of
their answers where it is properly a part of an explanatory instruction
or definition. 58
51. See notes 88-89 infra and accompanying text.
52. See Schroeder v. Rainboldt, 128 Tex. 269, 279, 97 S.W.2d 679, 684 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1936, holding approved); Grasso v. Cannon Ball Motor Freight Lines, 125 Tex. 154, 161, 81
S.W.2d 482, 487 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1935, holding approved).
53. 128 Tex. 269, 97 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1936, holding approved).
54. Id at 279, 97 S.W.2d at 684; accord, Grieger v. Vega, 153 Tex. 498, 502, 271 S.W.2d 85,
87 (1954); Continental Oil Co. v. Barnes, 97 S.W.2d 494, 497 (rex. Civ. App. 1936).
55. See Grieger v. Vega, 153 Tex. 498, 502, 271 S.W.2d 85, 87 (1954). See text accompanying
notes 47-50 supra.
56. TaX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
57. TEx. R. Crv. P. 277. The Supreme Court of Texas is vested with rule making authority
by legislative enactment See TEx. RaV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1731a (Vernon 1962).
58. TEx. R. Civ. P. 277.
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The amendment apparently was intended to ease the inflexibility of the
59
Wisconsin rule.

Revised rule 277 tolerates any incidental conveyance of legal in-

formation that would aid the jury's understanding of an issue. But
comments directly referring to or compelling a particular outcome are
still objectionable. 60 The vagueness of the revision and the failure of
the Texas courts to enunciate specific parameters in the context of comparative negligence actions inevitably afford trial judges a great deal of
61
latitude in applying the rule against informing.

Although at one time the rule against informing was the clear ma-

jority rule among the states, 62 even then several exceptions restricted its
scope. The common-knowledge and conditional-question exceptions

and the emphasis on trial court discretion curtailed application of the
Wisconsin rule in situations where the rule was largely unnecessary.

These modifications substituted a more flexible approach for the rigid
Wisconsin approach of reversible error. The weakened rule, however,
was susceptible to the argument that little difference exists between dis-

cretion not to apply the rule and no rule at all.
59. The revision may have been motivated by the experience of the Texas courts with the rule
against informing in a comparative negligence context. In a series of cases tried under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976), the Texas courts attempted to reconcile the
state's practice of mandatory special verdict submission, see TEx. R. Civ. P. 277, and its recognition of the rule against informing, see the cases cited in notes 42-44 supra, with the FELA's requirement that "damages shall be diminished by the jury," 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1976). Initially the
courts found error in informing the jury that the damages were to be diminished in proportion to
the plaintiff's negligence. See Texas & P. Ry. v. Jefferson, 131 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939);
Panhandle & S.F. Ry. v. Sedberry, 46 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). The Texas courts eventually retreated from this position. In Texas & N.O. Ry. v. Tiner, 262 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953), the court of civil appeals found no error in the form of a question calling for the amount by
which the damages should be reduced as a result of the plaintiff's negligence. This holding was
premised on the fact that the question did not explicitly refer to the jury's answer to the total
damages question. Id at 773.
60. Pope & Lowerre, The State of the Special Verdict-1979, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 42-44
(1979); Pope & Lowerre, RevisedRule 277-4 Better Special Verdict Systemfor Texas, 27 Sw. L.J.
577, 589-90 (1973); see Scott v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273, 280 (Tex. 1978) ("the
explanatory instruction should focus the effect of the concept on the relevant issues that are to be
considered, but without reference to the result thereof'); Gulf Coast State Bank v. Emenhiser, 562
S.W.2d 449, 453 (Tex. 1978) ("The jury's concern is to find disputed facts, rather than to achieve a
particular result," and thus an instruction that if the jury found certain facts, then judgment
should be for a particular party, was impermissible).
61. Two other states, Idaho and Minnesota, conditioned the application of the rule against
informing on a grant of trial court discretion. See Cassia Creek Reservoir Co. v. Harper, 91 Idaho
488, 491, 426 P.2d 209, 211 (1967); Patterson v. Donahue, 291 Minn. 285, 288, 190 N.W.2d 864,
866 (1971).
62. See text accompanying notes 42-46 supra.
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C. Abrogation of the Rule Against Informing-The Emergence of a
New MajorityRule.
As the principle of comparative negligence became widely recognized in the early 1970s, the states observed that the role of the jury in a
negligence action had changed. Rather than answer simple yes or no
questions regarding the negligence of the parties, the jury was now
called on to quantify specific findings of relative fault. Clearly, courts
placed more trust in the jurors and judicial control over the jury
diminished.
The principle of damage apportionment was predicated on its inherent fairness, and many believed that it was inconsistent with that
purpose to "blindfold" the jury and deprive it of knowledge of the legal
effect of the special verdict findings. Consequently, a number of comparative negligence states chose to reject the rule against informing and
to permit the jury to be apprised of legal information in comparative
negligence actions.
Eight states have abrogated the Wisconsin rule in comparative
negligence actions by statute or procedural rule. Most of the statutes
63
require that the jury be informed of the legal effect of its findings.
The other statutes merely permit the jury to be informed, but require
ultimate-outcome instructions upon the request of a party to the action.64 In 1973 Minnesota amended its state rules of civil procedure to
grant wide discretion to trial courts in informing the jury.65 The
amendment provides that in all comparative negligence actions:
[The court shall inform the jury of the effect of its answers to the
percentage of negligence question and shall permit counsel to comment thereon, unless the court is of the opinion that doubtful or unresolved questions of law, or complex issues of law or fact are
involved, which may render such instruction
or comment erroneous,
66
misleading or confusing to the jury.

A grant of trial court discretion to determine in each case whether the
factfinding function would be better performed by an unenlightened
jury thus qualifies the general mandate to inform. 67
63. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111(4) (Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h(b)
(1981); HAWAii REv. STAT. § 663-31(d) (1976); OR. REv. STAT. § 18.480(2) (1979).

Colorado courts have interpreted the Colorado statute to mean that a trial court's failure to
give the requisite instruction is reversible error. See Loup-Miller v. Brauer & Assoc.-Rocky
Mountain, Inc., 40 Colo. App. 67, 70, 572 P.2d 845, 847 (1977); Appelgren v. Agri Chem., Inc., 39
Colo. App. 158, 159, 562 P.2d 766, 767 (1977).
64. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.141-2 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); Wyo. STAT.

§ 1-1-109(b)(iii) (1977).
65. MINN. R. Civ. P. 49.01(2).
66. Id

67. The Hawaii statute, although couched in obligatory language, similarly accords the trial
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In 1978 the Supreme Court of Idaho became the first state court of
last resort68 to reject the rule against informing. In Seppi v. Betty69 the
court observed that jurors frequently adjust their special verdict answers to achieve a predetermined result. If the legal effect of the answers is not obvious, the jury will speculate, often incorrectly, about the
legal effect and thereby subvert the factfinding process. 70 This problem
is accentuated in a modified "49%" state by the attractiveness of the

fifty-fifty allocation. The court reasoned, however, that an informed
jury would be more inclined to examine the facts closely rather than to

settle conveniently on a fifty-fifty apportionment. 7' The court therefore
held that informing the jury of the effect of a finding of 50% negligence
of the plaintiff is not reversible error.

The Seppi court was concerned about the accuracy and objectivity
of the jury's findings of fact. Consequently, the court added the follow-

ing provisos:
[W]e conclude that the trial courts should be given discretion not to
...inform the jury in those cases where the issues are so complex or
the legal issues so uncertain that such instructions would confuse or
mislead the jury.
...[T]he trial court has broad discretion to order a new trial when it
believes that the verdict . . . is a product of the jury's misunderstanding, prejudice or72bias, or that the jury has failed to properly
follow its instructions.

judge the discretion to determine whether to give an ultimate-outcome instruction: "The court
shall instruct the jury regarding the law of comparative negligence where appropriate." HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 663-31(d) (1976) (emphasis added). Thus, Hawaii joins Minnesota (generally for
informing) and Texas (generally against informing) in conditioning the application of its provision on the discretion of the trial court.
68. The first state court decision to reject explicitly the rule against informing was decided in
1973 by the Colorado Court of Appeals. Simpson v. Anderson, 33 Colo. App. 134, 517 P.2d 416
(1973), rei'd, 186 Colo. 163, 526 P.2d 298 (1974). The Supreme Court of Colorado subsequently
reversed this maverick decision and adopted a Wisconsin-type rule of reversible error. Simpson v.
Anderson, 186 Colo. 163, 526 P.2d 298 (1974). The Colorado legislature had the last word, however, when it abolished the rule against informing in 1975. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111(4)
(Supp. 1980).
69. 99 Idaho 186, 579 P.2d 683 (1978). The trial court in Seppi granted the defendant a new
trial because instructions were given that could have misled the jury about the effect of a finding
of contributory negligence. The jury had found the plaintiff and defendant equally negligent,
requiring a judgment for the defendant under Idaho's modified "49%" statute, IDAHO CODE § 6801 (1979). 99 Idaho at 188, 579 P.2d at 684-85.
70. 99 Idaho at 193, 579 P.2d at 690.
71. Id
72. Id at 195, 579 P.2d at 692.
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The Idaho approach established in Seppi is similar to that of Minnesota, which grants broad trial court discretion to choose whether to give
an ultimate-outcome instruction in a particular case.
In the year Seppi was decided, the Supreme Court of Kansas also
abrogated the rule against informing in the context of comparative negligence actions. In Thomas v. Board of Township Trustees73 the court
articulated three reasons for permitting ultimate-outcome instructions.
First, the typical jury already has a good idea of the result of its answers. Second, speculation by an unknowledgeable jury may lead to a
verdict not reflecting the jury's true intent, especially under the modified "49%" form of comparative negligence. And third, the jury's function of providing a just result requires knowledge of the legal effect of
the special verdict findings. 74 The court predicted that enlightened ju-

rors will do their best to follow the law as instructed and therefore held
that "it is not error for a trial court

. . .

to inform the jury as to the

legal effect of its answers in a comparative negligence case, where a
general instruction is given informing the jury of the theory and legal
effect of comparative negligence. . . .,,7 Thomas thus joined Seppi in
abrogating the Wisconsin rule solely in comparative negligence cases.
New Jersey is the most recent comparative negligence state to reject the rule against informing. The Supreme Court of New Jersey in
Roman v. Mitchel176 .stated that the jury's deliberations should not take
place in a vacuum or under mistaken notions of the law. 77 Echoing the
words of the Idaho court in Seppi, the Roman court observed that an
informed jury is better able to fulfill its factfinding function and held:
Hereafter, an ultimate outcome instruction should be given to a jury
in [a comparative negligence] trial. However, in a complex case involving multiple issues and numerous parties, the trial court, in the
exercise of sound discretion, could withhold
the instruction if it
78
would tend to mislead or confuse the jury.

73. 224 Kan. 539, 582 P.2d 271 (1978). The trial court instructed the jury on the legal effect
of the special verdict answers. The jury assessed the fault of the plaintiff and the defendant township at 49% and 5 1%respectively, resulting in a judgment for the plaintiff under Kansas's modified
"49%" statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1976). 224 Kan. at 540, 548, 582 P.2d at 273, 278-79.
74. 224 Kan. at 550, 582 P.2d at 280.
75. 224 Kan. at 551, 582 P.2d at 280. In a recent opinion, a lower court interpreted Thomas
as promulgating a mandatory rule and noted that a trial court that refuses to give an ultimateoutcome instruction in Kansas faces "sure reversal." Cook v. Doty, 4 Kan. App. 2d 499, 500, 608
P.2d 1028, 1030 (1980).
76. 82 N.J. 336, 413 A.2d 322 (1980). The trial judge refused to give a requested ultimateoutcome charge. This ruling was upheld by the appellate division, Roman v. Mitchell, 165 N.J.
Super. 68, 397 A.2d 729 (App. Div. 1979), rey'd, 82 N.J. 336, 413 A.2d 322 (1980), but reversed by
the supreme court. Roman v. Mitchell, 82 N.J. 336, 413 A.2d 322 (1980).
77. 82 N.J. at 345, 413 A.2d at 327.
78. Id at 346-47, 413 A.2d at 327.
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The court further instructed the trial courts of the state to set aside the

jury's findings if the judge concludes that the verdict is the product of
bias, prejudice, or misunderstanding.

79

The Wisconsin rule has thus fallen in disfavor in comparative negligence states. With the advent and general acceptance of the comparative negligence principle, the Wisconsin rule has yielded to a new

movement infavor of enlightening the jury about the legal effects of its
special verdict findings. Except for Wisconsin, Texas, and Arkansas,

the bastions of the rule against informing, all but one of the last twelve
states to rule expressly on the matter have removed the jury's "blind-

fold."80 In general, the state courts that have rejected the Wisconsin
rule have chosen trial court discretion to inform the jury over an absolute requirement that ultimate-outcome instructions be given. The
state statutes abrogating the rule against informing, however, tend to

81
give less discretion to the trial court.

IV.

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE
RULE AGAINST INFORMING

The following discussion assesses the advantages and disadvantages of the Wisconsin rule in light of the purposes of special verdicts,
the jury's factfinding task when special verdicts are used, and the jury's
role in the equitable determination of civil claims. The discussion

demonstrates that the abrogation of the rule against informing contravenes the intent of the comparative negligence principle. When special
verdicts are used in a comparative negligence action, the jury should
not be informed about the legal effect of its answers.
One of the goals of special verdict submission is to assist the jury
79. Id at 347, 413 A.2d at 327. For a useful analysis of theRoman decision, see 12 RUTGERS
LJ.365 (1981).
80. The states that have rejected the Wisconsin rule in the past decade are Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, and
Wyoming. The highest court of Utah, the most recent comparative negligence state to embrace
the rule against informing, see McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co., 529 P.2d 423 (Utah 1974)
(applying Idaho law, but indicating that Utah law suggests the same result), recently expressed a
desire to join the above states in abrogating the rule. In Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 (Utah
1979), three of the five justices went on record as favoring a reassessment of McGinn. Four of the
justices held, however, that the issue was first raised on appeal and thus not properly before the
court. Id at 533.
A lower court in Pennsylvania recently held that a comparative negligence jury should be
informed of the effect of the special verdict answers. Peair v. Home Ass'n, 430 A.2d 665 (Pa.
Super. 1981). The court approved the ultimate outcome instruction that was given by the trial
judge and observed that such an instruction is "essential if the jury is to be able to apply the
equitable considerations and arrive at the compromises that are an inherent part of the jury system." Id at 672.
81. See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.

DUKE LAW JOURNWL

[Vol. 1981:824

in rendering objective findings of fact.82 Because there is no general
verdict against which to test the factual findings, the findings must be
free from bias, sympathy, or prejudice for or against either party. 83 Informing the jury of the legal effect of the answers is improper if the
court submits special verdicts, which are not wholly determinative of
the right of recovery.84 The jury's task in a comparative negligence
action of assessing and quantifying the relative fault of the parties does
not alter the basic purposes underlying special verdict submission.
In Lowery v. Clouse8 5 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
raised a particularly bothersome argument. The Lowery opinion suggests that if a trial court is granted unlimited discretion to submit either
special verdicts, a general verdict with special interrogatories, or a general verdict, it may also submit a form of verdict that combines attributes of two different verdict types.8 6 The court thus concluded that the
trial court may, in its discretion, inform the jury about the legal effect
of special verdict answers.
There is no logical explanation why discretion to submit any one
of three verdict types warrants submission of a synthesis of two of the
types. Indeed, availability of a choice between verdict types militates
in favor of a rule against informing when special verdicts are used. If a
judge deems it to be in the parties' best interests to inform the jury, a
general verdict form, perhaps accompanied by special interrogatories,
should be submitted and a general charge given. If such information
would be undesirable in a particular case, special verdicts may be submitted without a general charge. Giving an ultimate-outcome instruction with the submission of special verdicts, however, nullifies the
distinction between special verdicts and special interrogatories that accompany a general verdict.
The synthesis type of verdict approved in Lowery is unnecessary
when the trial judge is aware of the distinct benefits of alternative verdict forms. Moreover, if special verdict submission is mandatory under
a state's comparative negligence law, the governmental body from
82. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
83. See McGowan v. Story, 70 Wis. 2d 189, 198, 234 N.W.2d 325, 329 (1975); Gay, "Blindfolding"the Jury: Another View, 34 TEx. L. REv.368, 378 (1956).

84. See Smith v. Gizzi, 564 P.2d 1009 (Okla. 1977); Note, supra note 4, at 115-19, 132. On
the other hand, when the jury returns a general verdict, it must know the legal effect of the answers to interrogatories in order to determine the issue of liability in accordance with the applicable law. See Thode, ComparativeNegligence, ContributionAmong Tort-Feasors,andthe Effect 0/a
Release-A Trple Play by the Utah Legislature, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 406, 414.
85. 348 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1965).

86. See id at 260-61. See also Smith, supra note 35, at 217-20; 43 MINN. L. Rv.823, 824-25
(1959). The Lowery case is discussed at note 46 supra.
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which the law emanated most likely intended a specific division of responsibility between judge and jury. The issue of liability has been
removed from the jury's consideration. Thus, abrogation of the rule
special verdict subagainst informing is inconsistent with mandatory
87
actions.
negligence
comparative
in
mission
A state should prescribe the use of the type of verdict that comports with the desired role of the jury under the state's comparative
negligence law. The jury should be instructed only to the extent that it
is proper under the type of verdict selected. Consequently, states that
want to inform the jury in all cases should provide for mandatory general verdict submission in comparative negligence trials. States willing
to give discretion to trial judges to determine whether to inform the
jury in a particular case should provide for discretionary special or general verdict submission. A jurisdiction should adopt a consistent policy
regarding verdict submission and the accompanying jury instructions.
Abrogation of the rule against informing is inconsistent with the
jury's task of objective factfinding in comparative negligence cases in
which special verdicts are used. As a general proposition, the average
juror does not, prior to trial, know the effect of comparative negligence
findings on the outcome of the case.88 This information therefore may
not be conveyed to the jury under the traditional common-knowledge
exception to the rule against informing. 89 In a particular case, how-

ever, if the jury already knows the legal effect of the percentage findings, an ultimate-outcome instruction unnecessarily restates the jury's
prior knowledge. In the more typical case in which the jury does not
87. The argument that informing the jury is inconsistent with the purposes of special verdict
submission is relevant to civil trials generally and is not limited to comparative negligence actions
in particular.
88. See Note, supra note 4, at 118. But see Thomas v. Board of Township Trustees, 224 Kan.
539, 550, 582 P.2d 271, 280 (1978). In a modified comparative negligence state, it is highly unlikely that the potential jurors are aware of the 50% or 51% bar to the plaintiff's recovery. See
Note, Informing the Jury of the Effect of ItsAnswers to Special Verdict Questions-The Minnesota
Experience, 58 MwNN. L. REv. 903, 929 (1974) (referring to Minnesota's "49%" statute as "probably a mystery to the average juroe). Moreover, although the typical juror may perceive that the
percentage findings will have some effect on liability, it is doubtful that a juror will comprehend
the specific nature of the reduction by the court.
89. For a discussion of the common-knowledge exception, see text accompanying notes 47-50
supra. The exception, although applied frequently in negligence cases in which contributory negligence was a complete defense, is largely irrelevant under a comparative negligence system. The
primary reason for the difference is that with contributory negligence the special questions are
generally answered either "yes" or "no." It would be difficult for a juror to sit through an entire
trial and not be able to discern whose side a particular answer will benefit. See Green & Smith,
Negligence Law, No-Fault, andJury Trial-I, 50 TEx. L. REv. 1093, 1113-14 (1972). See also
Comment, Special Verdicts: R"de 49 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,74 YALE L.J. 483, 493
(1965). On the other hand, the numerical answers to special verdict questions in comparative
negligence cases are not conducive to such perceptions.
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know the legal effect of the percentage findings, conveying such information during the trial adversely affects the jury's factflnding role.
The courts that have rejected the Wisconsin rule have expressed
the concern that uninformed jurors, anticipating the legal effect of the
numerical findings, will speculate incorrectly and render a verdict that
does not reflect the jury's true intent. 90 They contend that rather than
rely on the jurors' chance understanding of the state's comparative negligence law, the trial court should inform the jury of the effect of the
findings on the outcome of the case. 91 This argument fails, however, to
address the real problem facing the courts in such situations. The concern should not be with the possibility that an uninformed jury will
speculate incorrectly, but instead with the tendency to speculate itself.
An outcome-oriented jury, bent on manipulating the special verdict
findings in order to achieve a desired result, functions beyond its contemplated role in a comparative negligence system whether or not it is
correct in its appraisal of the legal effect of the answers.
One commentator has urged that a jury is less likely to manipulate
the factual findings under a comparative negligence system than under
a contributory negligence system because the former is more consistent
with a jury's notion of fairness. 92 Logic indicates, however, that a jury
bent on achieving a particular result would be as inclined to adjust the
findings in a comparative negligence system as it would under the allor-nothing system. 93 The difference is that the probability of an unin94
tended result is much greater under a comparative negligence system.
For this reason, the jury should be prevented from adjusting the
percentage findings to achieve a predetermined result. The rule against
informing is a step toward eliminating jury manipulation because it
removes the tools used by the jury to accomplish such manipulation.
A return to the Wisconsin rule alone will not eliminate the tendency of juries to speculate about the outcome of their special verdict
90. See Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 193, 579 P.2d 683, 690 (1978); Thomas v. Board of

Township Trustees, 224 Kan. 539, 550, 582 P.2d 271, 280 (1978).
91. See Simpson v. Anderson, 33 Colo. App. 134, 139, 517 P.2d 416, 419 (1973), rep'd, 186
Colo. 163, 526 P.2d 298 (1974).
92. See Comment, McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co.-Jury Blindfolding in Comparative

Negligence Cases, 1975 UTAH L. REv. 569, 577.
93. For example, assume that a jury desires that the plaintiff recover a $10,000 judgment in a
particular case. If contributory negligence is a complete defense, the jury will return a verdict
finding no contributory negligence and assessing the plaintiffs damages at $10,000. Under a modified comparative negligence system, the plaintiff's fault will be assessed at something less than
50%, with the gross damages finding adjusted accordingly. These examples illustrate that any
outcome-oriented jury is apt under contributory negligence or comparative negligence to manipulate the factual findings to achieve the desired result.

94. See note 89 supra.
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answers. The rule against informing is only one of several safeguards
that courts can use to prevent jury manipulation of factual findings.
Another safeguard is for trial courts to give stern instructions informing
the jury of its proper role in trials in which special verdicts are submitted and cautioning the jury not to be concerned with the legal result of
its findings. 9" The response that juries would ignore such cautionary
instructions and continue to speculate 96 represents an unjustified distrust of jurors.

97

Although the court can regulate the information conveyed to the
jury during the trial, it cannot erase juror knowledge acquired prior to
trial. One means of reducing the likelihood that such prior knowledge
will affect the jury's verdict is the use of jury selection procedures intended to procure legally unsophisticated jurors. Another solution is to
implement a jury rotation system designed to minimize the number of
comparative negligence trials in which each juror serves. 98 Retention
of the rule against informing combined with these procedures will reduce the incidence of speculation about the legal effect of the
percentage findings by juries in comparative negligence cases. Reducing jury speculation will in turn lessen the jury's tendency to manipulate the special verdict answers to accord with a prearranged result.
The jury, therefore, will render more objective findings of fact as contemplated under the state's comparative negligence scheme.
In Roman and Seppi the courts maintained that an informed jury
is better able to perform its factfinding function. 99 Although an ultimate-outcome instruction may result in a more considered apportion95. In McGowan v. Story, 70 Wis. 2d 189, 234 N.W.2d 325 (1975), the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin gave the following advice to the trial courts of the state:
We suggest that the jury should be admonished, and impressed, that its function in a
negligence case is factfinding only and that it is not its role to usurp the legislative function under the comparative negligence law or the judicial function in interpreting the
comparative negligence law. It is the role of the judge, acting under the law, and not the
jury, to implement the general policies of the comparative negligence statute.
Id at 198-99, 234 N.W.2d at 330.
96. See Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEx. L. Rav. 273, 281 (1955); Green & Smith, supra
note 89, at 1113-14.
97. Opponents of the rule against informing argue that the rule is based on an inherent distrust of juries. See Comment, supra note 92, at 579. It is anomalous, however, to provide the
jurors with information on the legal effect of their answers and at the same time to expect them not
to inject bias into the process by manipulating the findings of fact in accordance with a prearranged result. See note 101 infra.
98. These procedures have apparently been successful in Wisconsin. See Decker, Some Random ObservationsAbout ComparativeNegligence and the Trial Process in Wisconsin, 1 CONN. L.
REv. 56, 63 (1968).
99. See Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 193, 579 P.2d 683, 690 (1978); Roman v. Mitchell, 82
N.J. 336, 346, 413 A.2d 322, 327 (1980).
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ment of fault, 1°° the jury does not necessarily become a better
factfinder. Instead, by molding its answers to reach a desired result or
by confirming that its findings comport with a desired result, the jury
becomes a law-finder.' 0 '
In rejecting the rule against informing, some courts have contended that under the rule the jury's deliberations take place in a vacuum.10 2 This argument is actually directed toward the propriety of
special verdicts themselves. The jury's role is clearly different when
special verdicts are used, because the deliberations are focused on the
resolution of specific factual questions and not on the determination of
the defendant's liability. 0 3 In any case, the jury does not operate in a
vacuum while performing its factfnding function in a comparative negligence action. It is instructed on the legal rules and definitions' 0 4 to be
applied to the underlying facts of the case in order to derive the special
verdict findings. Therefore, under the Wisconsin rule the jury is fully
trusted as a factfinder.
Informing the jury about the legal effect of the percentage findings
may confuse the jury unnecessarily in the performance of its factfinding duties.'0 5 The jury's task under a comparative negligence system
already entails a great deal of responsibility. 16 Although jurors faith100. See note 36 supra.
101. See McGowan v. Story, 70 Wis. 2d 189, 198, 234 N.W.2d 325, 329 (1975); Denton, In.
forming a Jury of the Legal Effect afItsAnswers, 2 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 10 (1970).
Some of the judicial decisions that reject the rule against informing purport to restrict the
jury's ability to manipulate the findings by leaving to the trial court the discretion to set aside
findings that are based on bias or misunderstanding. See Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 195, 579
P.2d 683, 692 (1978); Roman v. Mitchell, 82 NJ. 336, 347, 413 A.2d 322, 327 (1980). This restriction is not an effective restraint on jury manipulation for several reasons. First, jury manipulation
is nearly impossible to detect. Cf. Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the PersonalInjury Damage
,4ward, 19 OHo ST. L.J. 158, 167 (1958) (jury compromise on liability and damages under contributory negligence is often impossible to detect). Second, even if sympathy or misunderstanding
appears to exist, the trial court cannot investigate the matter further because of legal restraints on
verdict impeachment. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Wayne Broyles Eng'r Corp., 351
F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1965). Finally, the only effective means of setting aside the verdict is for the
court to declare a mistrial. This solution seems adequate, but it is anomalous to inform thejury of
the legal effect of its factual findings and to set aside the verdict when such information is put to
use. In any event, this solution is also available under the Wisconsin rule and its use would at
least be consistent with the purposes of that rule.
102. See Porche v. Gulf Miss. Marine Corp., 390 F. Supp. 624, 632 (E.D. La. 1975); Roman v.
Mitchell, 82 N.J. 336, 345, 413 A.2d 322, 327 (1980).
103. See text following note 23 supra.
104. For example, negligence, proximate cause, and right-of-way.
105. One of the purposes of special verdict submission is to reduce jury confusion caused by
complex legal instructions. See Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R., 167 F.2d 54, 64-65 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948).
106. The jury's factfinding duties are more pervasive in comparative negligence cases than in
cases in which contributory negligence is a complete defense. In addition to determining the
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fully attempt to digest instructions, they may lack the legal training and
experience needed to understand and apply comparative negligence
law. 0 7 Even if the jurors understand an ultimate-outcome charge, the
injection of additional numerical considerations will unnecessarily
complicate the jury's task. An informed jury that misunderstands the
charge may manipulate the factual findings based on a misperception
of the comparative negligence law. The manipulation of special verdict
answers to reach a result unintended by the jury is, ironically, the precise situation that the ultimate-outcome instruction is intended to
prevent.
Opponents of the rule frequently argue that the jury's role in a
civil trial is primarily to do justice and that a jury must be aware of the
legal effects of its answers in order to achieve a "just" result. 108 Unfortunately, however, when the jury manipulates the answers, it tends to
overemphasize the importance of the labels "plaintiff" and "defendant."'10 9 A jury that determines that the plaintiff is entitled to recover
some damages often ignores the fact that the defendant may also have
sustained damages and is himself a potential plaintiff. An emotional
judgment for the plaintif, simply because of his position as a plaintif,
precludes any contemporaneous or future recovery by the defendant.1 0
The notion that the jury's role is to apply a common-sense view of
justice in rendering its verdict arose from the perceived need for juries
to temper harsh rules of law in accordance with principles of equity
and fairness."' The "equity" argument, however, is not a criticism of
issues of negligence and proximate cause, the jury in a comparative negligence jurisdiction is
responsible for expressing its determinations in terms of specific numerical percentages.
107. See Avery v. Wadlington, 186 Colo. 158, 161-62, 526 P.2d 295, 297 (1974). The confusion
is increased when the court merely reads the state's comparative negligence statute to the jury, as
is mandated in North Dakota, N.D. CENr. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975), without further elaboration or
explanation.
108. See Porche v. Gulf Miss. Marine Corp., 390 F. Supp. 624, 632 (E.D. La. 1975); Thomas v.
Board of Township Trustees, 224 Kan. 539, 550, 582 P.2d 271, 280 (1978); Comment, CivilProcedure: Informing Comparative Negligence Juries What Legal Consequences Their Special Verdicts
Effect, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 606 (1979).

On the other hand, Judge Jerome Frank is highly critical of the perceived role of juries in
civil trials to achieve justice in the face of unfair laws and refers to the practice as 'Jury lawlessness." See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 126-37 (1949).
109. See Note, supra note 4, at 120; Sample SpecialInterrogatoryForms,Symposium on Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co-West VirginiaAdopts ComparativeNegligence, 82 W. VA. L. REv.
545, 548 app. n.5 (1980).
110. The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents a subsequent adjudication between the parties of the facts underlying the comparative negligence action. For a classic statement of the doctrine, see Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876).
111. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRiAL 127-33 (1949).
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the rule against informing, but of special verdicts generally."I2 When
special verdicts are submitted, the jury's role is limited to that of an
objective factfinder. 113 The jury's function of mitigating inflexible laws
is relevant primarily in cases in which a general verdict is returned.
The equity argument is generally inapposite to comparative
negligence actions. The notion that juries should do justice in the face
of harsh, unfair laws does not apply if the law involved is not inherently inequitable. Courts and legislatures have adopted comparative
negligence laws to relieve the inequities of the all-or-nothing contributory negligence defense. 14 Thus, in a comparative negligence action, it
is no longer desirable for a jury to mold the verdict to comport with
justice.
Comparing the effect of giving an ultimate-outcome instruction
with the jury practice of rendering a compromise verdict provides further evidence that the rule against informing does not impede the jury's
role of achieving justice. Prior to the widespread abrogation of the allor-nothing contributory negligence defense, juries in some states rendered compromise verdicts for plaintiffs whose negligence they deemed
slight compared with that of the defendant. A de facto comparative
negligence system thus existed whereby the jury expressly found no
contributory negligence but reduced the damages in proportion to the
perceived fault of the plaintiff. Hence, the jury, which believed that
contributory negligence was a harsh defense and desired that the plaintiff recover some amount, would compromise the issues of liability and
damages.115
De facto jury application of comparative negligence, although
morally justifiable as a means of ameliorating the inequitable contributory negligence defense, was largely unsuccessful in practice. In returning a compromise verdict, the jury ignored the court's charge on
the law of contributory negligence and instead applied its own notions
of fairness. This jury disregard of the law as instructed denigrated the
judicial system. Because the jury accomplished indirectly what it was
112. See Statement of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, 374 U.S. 865, 867-68 (1963)
(opposing the promulgation of FED. R. Civ. P. 49); Guinn, The Jury System and Special Verdicts,
2 ST. MARY'S L.J. 175 (1970).
113. See text accompanying notes 82-83 supra.
114. See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
115. See, eg., Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425,281 N.W. 261 (1938); Alibrandi
v. Helmsley, 63 Misc. 2d 997, 314 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1970); Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa.
227, 114 A.2d 150 (1955); Freshwater v. Booth, 233 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1977). For helpful discussions of the compromise verdict phenomenon in negligence cases, see J. ULMAN, A JUDGE TAKES
THE STAND 30-34 (1933); Gilliam, Comparative Negligence Under EarlierArkansas Statutes, 10
ARK. L. REv. 65, 65-66 (1955-1956); Maloney, From Contributoryto ComparativeNegligence: A
Needed Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 135, 144-45 (1958).
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not legally permitted to do directly, the adjudicative process was no
longer open and honest. This tainting of the adjudicative process resulted in a gap between the law in theory and the law in practice-a 6
gap that eroded public confidence in the fairness of the legal system."
The tendency of juries to return compromise verdicts rendered the

practical application of the law less uniform. Whether or not a particular jury would apply the law as instructed could not be predicted in
advance. As a result, contributory negligence was a complete defense
in some cases, but not in others.'

7

Furthermore, the level of tolerance

accorded to jury application of de facto comparative negligence varied
greatly among courts. Many courts rejected compromise jury verdicts
in theory, but tolerated them in practice, at least when the issue of liability was sufficiently in doubt."'
Informing the jury of the legal effect of its findings of fact in a

comparative negligence action is analogous to the de facto comparative
negligence practice with respect to the effect on the judicial process.
Support for informing the jury is based, in part, on a desire for the jury
to apply a community sense of justice." 9 In other words, an informed
jury is capable of either molding the percentage findings when it be116. In short, the compromise-verdict practice was premised on disrespect for the law. Fleming, supra note 10, at 242-43; Heft & Heft, The Two-Layer Cake: No FaultandComparativeNegligence, 58 A.B.A.J. 933, 934 (1972).
117. See Gay, supra note 83, at 378; Kalven, Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparadvev.
Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 897, 902-03
(1968).
118. Freshwater v. Booth, 233 S.E.2d 312, 315 (W. Va. 1977). See also Malone, Comments on
Maki v. Frelk-Comparativev. ContributoryNegligence: Should the Court or LegislatureDecide?,
21 VAN D.L. Rv. 930, 934 (1968). The possibility that the trial court would direct a verdict for
the defendant because of a holding that contributory negligence existed as a matter of law rendered the outcome of negligence cases even more unpredictable.
Similar in many respects to the compromise-verdict phenomenon in negligence cases is Arizona's approach to the contributory negligence defense. Article 18, section 5 of the Arizona Constitution provides that contributory negligence "shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question offact
and shall, at all times, be left to the jury." ARz. CoNsT. art. 18, § 5. The framers' intent apparently was to ameliorate the harshness of contributory negligence by establishing a de facto comparative negligence system. See Note, ComparativeNegligence in Arizona, 1979 AsuZ. ST. L.J.
581, 587. Arizona courts have construed the provision as leaving the question of whether to apply
the complete defense to the jury's discretion in all negligence cases. Thus, the jury is arbiter of
both fact and law, Steed v. Cuevas, 24 Ariz. App. 547, 540 P.2d 166 (1975); State v. Cress, 22 Ariz.
App. 490, 528 P.2d 876 (1974), and the trial court may not direct a verdict for the defendant,
Heimke v. Munoz, 106 Ariz. 26, 470 P.2d 107 (1970). See generally Note, ContributoryNegligence--onfusion Out of Compromise, 13 Anz. L. Rav. 556 (1971).
Arizona's approach alleviates a serious disadvantage of the compromise-verdict practice.
The approach is not based on jury disrespect for the court's charge because the instructions expressly inform the jury of its constitutionally derived power. But the other disadvantages of compromise-verdict recognition remain.
119. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
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lieves that the state's modified comparative negligence law would unfairly bar a recovery or adjusting the damages finding to allow the
recovery of a predetermined amount. This behavior, like the compromise-verdict practice, depends on the jury's disregard for both the law
of negligence as instructed by the court and the contemplated division
of responsibility between judge and jury when special verdicts are used.
Informing the jury, therefore, hinders judicial monitoring of the jury's
function. 120 As a result, the law becomes as unpredictable in practice
as it was when compromise verdicts were used.
Informing the jury and the compromise-verdict phenomenom are
also analogous in their impact on the development of the substantive
law. Tolerance of compromise verdicts in negligence cases tended to
ease public pressure for abrogation of the all-or-nothing contributory
negligence defense. Some commentators even suggested that adoption
of comparative negligence was unnecessary in view of the existing de
facto comparative negligence practice. 121 Consequently, the compromise-verdict practice delayed the adoption of the equitable comparative negligence principle by the states. 122
Permitting the jury to be apprised of the effect of the percentage
findings on the outcome of the case may satisfy public demand for a
change from a modified "49%" to a modified "50%" comparative negligence system because of the reduced incidence of fifty-fifty negligence
apportionments. Informing the jury also may inhibit a change from the
modified to the pure form by reducing the number of verdicts denying
recovery to plaintiffs around the 50% negligence level. Thus, those who
assert that the modified comparative negligence cut-off merely lowers
the arbitrary bar to recovery of contributory negligence' 23 and those
who point out the unfairness of a fifty-fifty allocation under the modified "49%" form' 24 defeat their cause by supporting ultimate-outcome
instructions. A lesson should be derived from the unsuccessful compromise-verdict practice under contributory negligence. A similar preoccupation with "jury lawlessness" is unnecessary and should not be
repeated under comparative negligence, a much more equitable principle of tort law than contributory negligence.
120. See note 101 supra.
121. See Harkavy, Comparative Negligence: The Reflections of a Skeptic, 43 A.B.A.J. 1115,
1116-17 (1957); Powell, ContributoryNegligence: A Necessary Check on the American Jury, 43
A.B.AJ. 1005, 1006 (1957).

122. Ironically, a practice that developed in response to the unfairness of contributory negligence actually resulted in the perpetuation of the all-or-nothing defense.
123. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
124. See text accompanying note 126 infra.
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Abrogation of the rule against informing frustrates the objective of
special verdict submission and the intended division of responsibility
between judge and jury under the comparative negligence scheme.
Furthermore, giving an ultimate-outcome instruction does not facilitate, and in some cases detracts from, the jury's performance of its
factfinding function. Finally, the jury's role of tempering harsh rules of
law is not germane to comparative negligence actions in which special
verdicts are used.
V.

A

SUGGESTED PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK FOR RETAINING THE

RULE AGAINST INFORMING

Permitting juries to be informed of the legal effect of their special
verdict answers benefits plaintiffs in comparative negligence cases by
preventing the dismissal of a negligence claim when such a result is not
intended by the jury.12 5 However, informing the jury overcompensates
plaintiffs for perceived inequities that can be solved through more direct and reasonable methods.
One reason the Seppi court rejected the rule against informing was
the attractiveness of a fifty-fifty negligence apportionment to juries and
the unfair result of such a finding in a modified "49%" comparative
negligence system. 126 The Seppi court recognized that in a state which
has adopted the "49%" form, defense counsel benefit by arguing to the
jury for a fifty-fifty apportionment or more subtly for an "equitable"
allocation in response to the "similar" faulty conduct of each party. If
the jury follows the advice, this argument is extremely prejudicial to
the plaintiff. The court can eliminate this prejudice by forbidding any
reference by counsel to anything resembling an equal apportionment of
negligence. 127 The Wisconsin rule prohibits such a reference by precluding counsel from providing information to the jury that cannot be
conveyed by instruction. 128
A jury that is aware of the legal effect of its findings is less likely to
apportion the fault hastily and equally between the plaintiff and the
defendant. 2 9 The court may take other measures, however, to ensure a
careful, studied assessment by the jury of the parties' negligence. The
court can emphasize to the jury the importance of the percentage findings by using firm instructions and by formulating clear special verdict
125. See Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 193, 579 P.2d 683, 690 (1978); Thomas v. Board of

Township Trustees, 224 Kan. 539, 551, 582 P.2d 271, 280-81 (1978).
126. Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 193, 579 P.2d 683, 690 (1978).

127. See Note, supra note 4, at 126.
128. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
129. See note 36 supra.
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questions that are logically arranged. Relaxing the requirement of juror unanimity in special verdict answers1 30 might reduce the likelihood
of a compromise fifty-fifty negligence finding. Consideration of human
nature, however, suggests that a finding of equal fault would still be the
3
most common apportionment.' '
Despite the apparent unfairness of a dismissal of the plaintiff's
complaint in the case of a fifty-fifty negligence allocation, there are certain justifications for this result. 32 The legislature or highest court of a
state, presumably aware of the advantages and disadvantages of modified "49%" comparative negligence and the natural tendency of a jury
toward equal apportionment of fault, nevertheless has exercised its
constitutional authority to impose the 50% barrier. Allowing a jury to
mold its percentage findings to permit recovery when the jury believes
the plaintiff is 50% or more at fault violates the legislative or judicial
intent behind the modified "49%" system. 33 This intent should be
respected in the trial courts of the state.
The most logical and direct solution to the perceived unfairness of
modified comparative negligence is to amend the state's substantive
comparative negligence law. The modified "49%" form can be aban34
doned in favor of a modified "50%" comparative negligence system
or a pure comparative negligence system. To attack as arbitrary the
modified "49%" form by sanctioning jury adjustment of the factual
findings gives an unwarranted windfall to comparative negligence
plaintiffs.
Opponents of the rule against informing contend that giving ultimate-outcome instructions better enables the jury to consider separately the negligence and damages issues. 35 They argue that these
instructions thus prevent a "double deduction," whereby the jury
reduces the damages finding in accordance with the plaintiffs fault, unaware of the subsequent reduction by the court.' 36 Whether a complex,
legalistic charge could have such an effect, however, is doubtful. An
ultimate-outcome instruction may itself cause the jury to consider the
issues of fault and damages concurrently. And an informed jury might
130. See, eg., Wis. STAT. § 805.09(2) (1977) (five-sixths of the jurors must agree on all the
special verdict answers).
131. See note 34 supra.
132. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
133. See Note, supra note 4, at 125.
134. For a discussion of the Wisconsin experience, see text accompanying notes 32-39 supra.
135. Cf Comment, supra note 92, at 578 (in a case in which the jury was not informed, the
jurors mistakenly confused the negligence and damages findings).
136. See note 21 supra.
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answer the damages question with an eye toward the plaintiffs total
recovery in light of the negligence finding.
A more effective solution to the "double deduction" problem is to
give instructions and special verdict questions that clearly inform the
jury that its damages finding represents the total damages suffered by
the plaintiff without regard to the plaintiffs fault. Although the jury is
indirectly told that the percentage findings will have some bearing on
the outcome of the case, the information conveyed clearly falls within
the common-knowledge exception 137 to the Wisconsin rule. The jury
should not be instructed that the court will reduce the damages. This
information is not common knowledge of the average juror and it may
lead the jury to inflate the gross damages figure in anticipation of the
subsequent reduction.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Informing the jury of the legal effect of its special verdict answers
in a comparative negligence action violates the comparative negligence
scheme established by the legislature or highest court of a state and
defeats the very object of special verdict submission. Giving an ultimate-outcome instruction to the jury, in effect, converts the special verdicts into a general verdict with special interrogatories. The trial
court's function is thereby limited to the mechanical task of converting
the jury's findings into a judgment that accords with the jury's
expectations.
The rule against informing is most effective as a mandatory
rule.' 38 If a state wishes to give trial judges the ability to decide
whether to inform the jury, the state should grant judges discretion to
submit either special or general verdicts. The decision whether to give
an ultimate-outcome instruction then becomes a function of the type of
verdict selected.
The judge must instruct the jury clearly about the jury's role in the
state's comparative negligence scheme. The court's charge should admonish the jury neither to speculate about the legal result of the
percentage findings nor to manipulate the answers to accomplish a pre137. See notes 47-50 supra and accompanying text.

138. Although an ultimate-outcome instruction may be desirable in unusual or complex cases,
it is unlikely that adequate standards could be developed to denote the situations in which informing would be permissible. Provisions in Minnesota and a few other states that grant the trial court
discretion not to inform the jury in certain situations have been criticized for lacking standards
and inviting "fruitless appellate litigation.' See Note, Informing the Jury of the Effect of Its Answers, supra note 88, at 929-32. The same complaint can be made about the Texas approach,
which grants trial judges the discretion to inform the jury in some cases. See text accompanying

notes 57-61 supra.
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determined result. The instructions must apprise the jury of the true
meaning of the damages answer--that it represents the total damages
incurred by the plaintiff-and that the jury should formulate the damages answer without regard to the other findings of fact.
Recognition of the rule against informing, combined with the use
of trial procedures that apprise the jury of its intended role in the comparative negligence system, ensures an open and straightforward adjudication of negligence claims. Adoption of these procedural measures
with special verdict submission enables the jury to reach objective and
unbiased factual findings. These findings, when plugged into the comparative negligence formula by the trial judge, result in a judgment
based on objective fairness to all parties. And fairness is the hallmark
of the comparative negligence principle.
Stuart F Schaffer

